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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

DATA AND MEANING IN COGNITION[1]

THE interpenetration of the particular and the universal in every instance of knowing was characterized by Plato as "the everlasting quality of reason." A similar observation is made by Kant in the familiar statement: "Perceptions without conceptions are blind, conceptions without perceptions are empty." The logical impossibility of separating the two is seen in Aristotle's statement that "He who makes an induction points out something, but does not demonstrate anything." That an important truth is contained in these statements no one would deny, but the descriptive manner in which this interrelation is to be conceived is a matter of extreme difficulty.

I propose to set the following discussion, not in terms of the particular and the general, but in terms of data and meaning. All data are particular; and all meanings, as distinguished from things meant, are general.

The problem which is uppermost in my mind will come to be definitely formulated by reflecting upon certain obvious facts of elementary logic. The verification of an hypothesis, as every one knows, involves two steps: (1) Deduction through conceptual inference of its theoretical implications; and (2) Comparison of these implications with the facts either as given in observation or as determined by experimentation.

The hypothetical syllogism is the formal vehicle for the expression of the results of the process of verification. The antecedent in the hypothetical major expresses the hypothesis, the consequent expresses the implications deduced from it. In the minor premise the thought process shifts from conceptual inference to observation or experimentation. Every experiment functions logically as the minor premise of a hypothetical syllogism. In the hypothetical syllogism, therefore, the major premise expresses meaning, the minor premise expresses data, and the conclusion is a cognition.

Now, we also know that in order to obtain a valid conclusion we must either affirm the antecedent or deny the consequent. When reasoning takes the form of affirming the antecedent, it moves within

[1] Read at the meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association at Urbana, Ill., April, 1925.

the limits of perceptual inference. For instance, if the symptoms *a*, *b*, *c*, *d* are present, this is a case of pneumonia. Observation or experimentation reveals that these symptoms are present, the conclusion that this is pneumonia is valid. While the conclusion is logically valid, the example is not one of reasoning at all. It is only a case of complex perceptual inference; there has been no hypothesis set up to investigate. The heart of reasoning consists in conceptual inference, and where there are no implications deduced from an hypothesis, there is no genuine reasoning at all.

This is equivalent to saying that reasoning arises only when we undertake to affirm or deny the consequent on the basis of deduced implications. We know, of course, that the conclusion is valid when we deny the consequent. And this means that the conclusion is negative. From this it would seem to follow that the main purpose of the hypothetical syllogism is the elimination of false hypotheses. It is easy to prove that a conclusion is false, but it is not so easy to prove that it is true.

But much of reflection, both in practical deliberation and in scientific research, takes the form of affirming the consequent. The form of reasoning then shifts from the hypothetical to the disjunctive syllogism. P is either x, or y, or z. Observation or experimentation shows that it is neither y nor z; the conclusion, therefore, is that P is x. The elimination of y and z was determined by the denial of the consequent, and is, therefore, valid. The conclusion that P is x rests on the elimination of false hypotheses.

Now, the problem with which I am concerned is this: Have we any reason for believing that P is x other than the falsity of its being y or z? Or as expressed in general terms: Have we any reason for believing that a thing is so other than the rejection of all rival reasons? Those who answer these questions in the negative are led to say that disjunction is the basis of all induction, and that elimination is the basis of all truth. The proof would be all that our minds could ask if the alternatives were contradictories. But where there are a number of alternative hypotheses, the possibility would always be present that their enumeration had not been exhaustive. The eliminative theory of induction contains no positive basis of truth. The best that we can do is to say that in the absence of contradiction it is justifiable to believe. Of certainty we might say what Schopenhauer said of materialism, even at its birth it has death in its heart. The lurking possibility of error is invincible.

When an insuperable difficulty arises at the end of an analysis, one suspects that it is due to the intrusion of false initial assumptions. The eliminative theory, with its ineradicable element of risk,

is worked out in terms of the assumption that data and meaning occupy separate realms of being. This view is, of course, as old as Plato. It is reaffirmed by Kant: "Understanding can perceive nothing; the senses can think nothing." The distinction between data and meaning is a qualitative distinction. Kant solved the problem in terms of transcendentalism and epistemology. The eliminative theory of induction is a statement that the problem has, on purely empirical grounds, no solution at all. It escapes metaphysics and epistemology, but yields no truth.

On the assumption of the metaphysical distinction between data and meaning, induction is a movement from data to meaning, and knowledge is the application of meaning to data. There is here, I think, a double difficulty. The theory has to show how the mind can pass from data to meaning, that is, it has to account for the so-called inductive "leap" of thought. Now, I know of no process capable of empirical description which is able to render an intelligible account of the bridging of the gap between two qualitatively distinct spheres.

The second difficulty arises in connection with the application of meanings to data. If meanings are external to the data, metaphysically distinct from them, then we can never be sure that we have applied the right meaning. We can only be sure of the inapplicability of false meanings.

On this theory, then, induction is a mystery; deduction is a guess; and truth is an accident.

I have not, of course, forgotten that there is such a thing as a categorical syllogism. In categorical form, the major premise expresses "meaning," the minor premise expresses "data," and the conclusion expresses "knowledge." For example, what kind of rug is this? I make the conjecture that it is a Persian rug. This is an inductive hypothesis. I proceed to verify it. I reason as follows: If this is a Persian rug, it will have the traits so and so (the traits so and so being the implications deduced from the hypothesis); I turn to observation and look for the traits so and so (the second step in verification); on comparison of the theoretical implications with the facts, I find complete agreement; I conclude that it is a Persian rug. The actual process of reflection deals with the derivation of the hypothesis, deduction of its implication, and the comparison of theory with fact. If, now, I wish to express the results of my reflection, I formulate them syllogistically. All Persian rugs have the traits so and so; this rug has the traits so and so; therefore, this rug is Persian. The major premise expresses generalized or conceptualized meaning; the minor premise represents particular data determined by observation; the conclusion expresses the knowledge mediated by data and meaning.

But the syllogism contains an undistributed middle, and may, therefore, be inconclusive. To be valid I would have to say: All rugs that contain the traits so and so are Persian; this rug contains those traits, and is, therefore, Persian. But, again, this form is no more than perceptual inference, and is not a case of reasoning at all. Wherever there is genuine reasoning, there is the formal fallacy of an undistributed middle. Every undistributed middle is a form of plurality of causes, and we are right back to the eliminative theory of induction.

The difficulty involved in the fallacy of undistributed middle is met by the introduction of another theory of induction, namely, induction through scientific analysis. The view here expressed is that "laws," "principles," "meanings," "definitions," are not external to data, but are inherent in them. If the view that induction through analysis is a correct account of the establishment of scientific generalizations, it means that the generalizations are read out of the facts. They are statements of the underlying order and connection inherent *within* the facts.

For a statement of the theory of "Induction through Analysis," I turn to Professor Robinson's recent book, *The Principles of Reasoning:*

"The true solution of the problem of the inductive leap is to deny that there is any gap or chasm between the particular instances and the general scientific law which explains those cases. The scientist does not pass from the facts to the law. *He finds the law, or, better, the systematic connection in the instances.* This he is able to do by subjecting a variety of instances to careful analysis or even to experimentation, and by comparing and studying the results until the underlying system, of which the instances and their elements are all fragments, is finally brought to light and formulated as a law."[2]

According to this theory, there is, in the foregoing example, no passage of thought from the traits so and so to Persian, and no reverse movement from Persian to these traits. These traits *are* Persian rug, and Persian rug *is* these traits. There is identity of data and meaning. And my conclusion is true, not because I have eliminated false hypotheses, but because the concept "Persian" is the definition of these traits. The concept is not something external and applied from without. In general, then, we may say that laws and principles are not formulations of facts, numerically distinct from them; they are descriptive statements of the underlying order and connection resident within the facts. The theory of induction through analysis gains what logical force it has from the identifica-

[2] *The Principles of Reasoning*, p. 211.

tion of data and meaning. This would imply, I should suppose, the metaphysical theory of idealism. Logic would then be implicated in metaphysics.

Every one is familiar with Mill's criticism of the syllogism on the ground that it is a *petitio principii*. Mill's criticism is usually met by saying that he misunderstood the purpose of the syllogism. The important thing about a syllogism, as Aristotle well knew, was not that the conclusion was novel, but that it was true. The syllogism is not an instrument of discovery, but an instrument of proof.

Now, what does the syllogism prove? It proves nothing but that *a* is *a*. Induction through analysis, by turning logic into metaphysics, yields truth, but no more truth than is expressed in the law of identity.

We seem, then, to be confronted with this dilemma. If we separate data and meaning, induction is a mystery; if we identify them, induction is tautology.

Now it would be foolish to deny that order, system, pattern, form are discoverable in nature. The physical scientist discovers and describes the laws of nature; the psychologist discovers and describes the patterns of behavior. These laws and patterns are objective realities, as much so as the form of the Big Dipper. We come to know them through observation and experimental analysis. The design of the tapestry, the outline of the argument, the structure of the musical composition, the system of the solar bodies, are as much metaphysical existents as the materials and elements entering into their composition. There is no "matter" without "form," and no "form" without "matter." "Matter" and "form" are metaphysical categories. The "particulars" are metaphysical existents, the "universals" (laws and patterns) are metaphysical realities. The particular and the universal are united in nature. What induction through analysis does is to inform us that such and such universals are identical with such and such particulars. When this identification is brought to light we have a "something known." Knowledge, therefore, is the identification of form with matter. And there is, consequently, no gap between them, no inductive "leap" of thought in passing from one to the other.

This further implies that the data and meaning employed in reflection are identical with "matters" and "forms" discoverable in nature. The identification of form and matter is the same as the identification of data and meaning. The things known are at the same time the means to knowing. Knowing becomes one with being, and logic is a branch of metaphysics. The net outcome seems to me to be the reduction of knowledge to tautology.

In forming a critical estimate of the foregoing interpretation of induction through analysis, I quote a passage from Mr. Santayana: "Knowledge is not eating, and we can not expect to devour and possess *what we mean*. . . . A principle that is to remain a principle can never become a fact. A God that you could see with the eyes of the body, a heaven you might climb into by a ladder planted at Bethel, would be parts of this created and interpretable world, not terms in its interpretation nor objects in a spiritual sphere." [3]

In this point I must agree with Mr. Santayana. There is a fundamental difference between description and interpretation. Interpretation presupposed detachment from existence. Not all of the elements entering into the description of events are themselves to be found among the events described. The concepts employed in the interpretation of experience can not be projected on to the same plane of existence as the things they interpret.

Let us take an illustration of the utmost simplicity, namely, the reflective analysis of a critical situation in a ball game. The short-stop, let us say, receives a batted ball. What shall he do with it? At first he does not *know*. Reflection begins with an analysis of the gross total situation into its factual elements and potential meanings. There are, we will suppose, runners on the first and the third bases, and there is one man out. The runners on the first and the third bases and the one man out are "data." Then there are projected in the imagination certain possible plays. The short stop *may* throw the ball to the first or to the second or to the third base, or he *may* throw it to the home base. These potential lines of action are the "meanings." Together with the data they constitute the factors in terms of which reflection goes on. The thought process advances in terms of the development of the meanings in their relation to the data.

Let us now consider the status which each of the two factors occupies. The data are not metaphysical facts. Of course, there is a sense in which they are metaphysical facts. *Outside* the game situation they are objective facts in a metaphysical order. But *within* the context of the game they acquire added qualities. The man on the first base is a man who *may* run to the second base; the man on the third base is a man who *may* run home and thus add to the score. Each runner is a man with a threat. It is the added quality of the threat that transforms the runner from an objective fact in a metaphysical order to a datum of reflection. The added quality is acquired by virtue of the runner's relation to the game. When he becomes a factor to be taken account of in reflection he

[3] *The Life of Reason*, Vol. I, p. 77.

becomes a *relevant* fact, a *significant* datum, a *crucial* instance. The relevance and significance of the datum are qualities due solely to the context in which they are taken. Within this context these added qualities are quite real, but outside that context they have no reality at all. Data, therefore, are not metaphysical facts given *to* reflection, they are cognitive elements given *in* reflection. By means of data thought gets a working foothold. Data constitute the initial basis of thought and afford the material basis of inference. It is when physical things are taken as *signs* of other things that they acquire a significance that renders them suitable elements of reflection. Data, therefore, occupy a *logical* status. They are not things about which we think; they, together with meanings, are the things we think with.

A similar observation may be made with reference to "meanings." The logical relation of meaning is entirely different from the metaphysical relation of natural connection. Practical action and possibly esthetic experience take meanings as if they were solidly objectified qualities. But then reflection is to be distinguished from action as knowing is to be distinguished from being. The meanings which operate in reflection are purely mental creations. Meanings have no existence except when they are meant. An unmeant meaning would be meaningless. In the illustration before us the meanings are ideal and imaginative forecastings of possible lines of actions, eventualities which have no existence except as representations in thought.

Data and meaning, therefore, constitute the mechanism of thought. Springs and wheels are the things that a watch keeps time with; they constitute the mechanism of time-keeping. It is not, of course, that a watch uses springs and wheels as instruments of time-keeping; but time-keeping is accomplished through the mediation and coöperation and mutual adjustment of these parts. And similarly thought has its mechanism. Data and meaning are not things known; they are things we know with. In the above illustration, the final judgment, the decision of what to do, the cognition, is not the identification of data and meaning; it is the utilization of data and meaning as means to knowing. The thing known is what to do with the ball, a cognitive consummation mediated and accomplished through the coöperative and interpenetrating agencies of data and meaning in their interrelation.

The parts entering into the mechanism of thought have no existence outside the context of reflection. Knowing describes a realm of being metaphysically distinct from the particulars and universals discoverable in nature. It is the mistake of traditional empiricism

to suppose that data, the emergent elements yielded by reflective analysis, are passively given and that they constitute the antecedents of thought. But data are not given actualities of experience; they appear *inside* the thought movement as *discriminated* elements to be taken account of in inquiry. Failure to observe the logical as opposed to the metaphysical status of data is also the mistake of analytic realism. The realist asserts that what is true for logical analysis is at the same time true for reality. The view is that the status which elements are discovered to occupy in the context of analysis is the status which they occupy in the objective realm of metaphysical being. It is the thesis of realism that knowing makes no difference to the objects known. Objects are the same in and out of the cognitive context. Knowing does nothing to objects except through analysis to discover them. Consequently, data, the elements into which the situation is analyzed, are the structural elements which compose the situation before reflection intervened.

Recognition of the strictly logical status of data and meaning affords a basis of escape from the so-called anti-intellectualism associated with the name of Bergson. Bergson, rightly seeing that analysis is not the laying bare of the components of reality, components which in their existential status are, for the realist, the same before and after their dissection by thought, concludes that the results of analysis are *mere* abstractions, falsifications and machinations of our abstract-making intellect. But the view that analysis is falsification is as erroneous as the view that analysis reveals reality. Data as factors in reflection are just as real as the things about which we reflect. If anything, by virtue of their status as discriminated elements, as significant facts, they have gained rather than lost in richness of being. Instead of being *just* what they were, or *less* than what they were, by the addition of logical properties they have become *more* than what they were.

As it is the fallacy of empiricism to treat data as objective facts given to reflection, it is the fallacy of objective idealism to treat meanings as parts of an objective order system. The concepts and forms in terms of which reason organizes and interprets experience are thought to be literal transcriptions of nature. Whether with idealism one says that meanings, logical concepts, universals, are objective realities, or whether with neo-realism that they constitute a realm of "essences" subsisting outside the cognitive context, the result is the same, namely, the insistence that meanings exist outside the field of reflection. The idealistic phrase, "the concrete universal," is an excellent descriptive term to denote the cognitive context. But what is here insisted upon is that cognition is not to be

confused with the cognitive context in which it is set. To revert to our illustration, the game with its system of rules and relations is the cognitive context, the concrete universal; it affords the opportunity and sets the limits for the playing. Reflection goes on within this context, but is to be distinguished from it. In the illustration, the meanings, namely, the possible things which the player *may* do with the ball, are projected anticipations, ideas, hypotheses. They are elaborated and developed within the order system, but are no part of that system.

The terms and concepts and distinctions which characterize cognition not only have no existence outside the mechanism of reflection, but are themselves, at least in their cognitive aspects, creations of thought. Data and meanings are not given actualities of experience; they are inventions and devices of reflection. Thought makes for itself the terms and symbols which enter into its composition. It is not that reflection, acting as an agency from without, creates out of its own assertive energy the parts which compose the mechanism of its own operation. Reason is not something which comes into experience as through a door from without. It is not that reflection deposits data and meaning and subsequently utilizes them as intellectual resources. The fact of meaning is an ultimate fact; it is also a natural fact, natural in the sense that meanings in their first emergence occur as spontaneously as shocks of sentiency. Their appearance and self-regulated operation is just what is meant by reflection.

The relation of logic to metaphysics is similar to the relation of art to nature. Art is not contrasted with nature in terms of discontinuity. The products of art are the materials of nature organized and designed. The continuity of knowing and being may be expressed in terms of modes of being. Metaphysics, expressing actuality, may be termed the indicative mode of being. Reflection is its potential and subjunctive mode. When being reveals itself in the form of conditions, eventualities, potentialities, it appears in cognitive form.

Let us take one further illustration. Where will this comet be in two years from now? When I know that this comet is Halley's comet, and when I know the pattern of Halley's comet, I can answer the question. Knowing is not the identification of pattern with comet, of form with matter, of meaning with data, but pattern and comet are used as means to knowing something which is neither a comet nor a pattern, namely, "where this comet will be two years from now." The pattern in itself is not a meaning; it is a metaphysical reality. It becomes a meaning when it is taken in a context of inquiry and is utilized as a means to knowing something other

than itself. And similarly, when the pattern itself is the object of knowledge, other meanings and other data are employed in knowing it. The data and meanings entering into the analysis represent the results of prior analysis. In this case, the thing discovered is not the knowing, but the thing known. In the first case we employ pattern as a means to knowing x; in the second case other meanings are employed in knowing the pattern. What in the one case is a thing known is in another instance a means to knowing. This means that the status of meanings is not metaphysically determined; it is determined by the way they function in cognition.

We may conclude by reaffirming the position that there is a fundamental difference between description (the realm of metaphysics) and interpretation (the realm of reflection). Data and meaning are concepts of explanation, but not things explained. The terms entering into reflection are not themselves the things about which we reflect. If data were metaphysical "matters" and if meanings were objective "forms," all knowing would lapse into being and all being would remain unintelligible. Mind would then have no existence and interpretation would have no method.

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THE LOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF REDISCOVERED KNOWLEDGE[1]

IT IS natural for people of the twentieth century to assume that our existing body of knowledge contains all the facts and processes which were within the ken of earlier men, plus the infinitely rich new content of modern science. A corollary of this assumption is that the prodigious enrichment of knowledge by the scientific research of the past three centuries—that is, since the time of Gilbert, Galileo, Harvey, and others—makes that part of knowledge which was attained by all preceding generations pale into insignificance. But in truth both the assumption and its corollary are unwarranted. In the light of archæology we can not doubt that the ancients knew a good many valuable and highly significant facts which nobody knows to-day. It goes without saying that the amount of this lost knowledge is beyond any one's power to estimate, but just recently years of patient research have fructified in the recovery of a number of extremely important items. In fact, there is good reason to believe that we are only at the beginning of this process of salvaging a rich cultural inheritance from the extinct civilizations upon the ruins of

[1] Read at the meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, Urbana, Illinois, April 9, 1925.

which our own has been built. Such items as have already been recovered are here named *rediscovered knowledge,* and it will be well to recall some typical examples.

The tomb of King Tut-ank-ahmen was known to the architect who designed it, to the builders who laboriously erected it, and to nameless loyal attendants who, after embalming and laying the king's body to rest in the inner throne-room and after filling the other chambers with his precious belongings, sealed the entrance. It was known, too, to the indefatigable tomb robbers who plundered some of its treasures within two decades of the burial and plastered up the holes they had made in the walls. Then for hundreds of years it was buried beneath the dust and sands of Egypt until its unsealing revealed to the eager eyes of Doctor Carter and Lord Carnarvon priceless heirlooms of a bygone age, all of which objects may from our viewpoint be regarded as items of rediscovered knowledge. Less than a year ago the press reports told of an obscure mechanic selling for a fortune the formula for tempering copper, which he had rediscovered after it had been lost since the time of the Egyptians. A most fascinating article in a recent number of the *Atlantic Monthly* told of an American archæologist, Mr. H. L. Skavlem, rediscovering the principle of the conchoidal fracture which was known and used by the American aborigines in the making of flint arrow-heads centuries before they knew anything about the use of iron tools. A distinguished British archæologist, who has been lecturing in this country under the auspices of the American Archæological Society, describes how the Myceneans, who lived on the coast of Greece centuries before the Golden Age of Athens, made protective helmets out of wild boar's tusk and hide. Yet these are only a few of the items of knowledge of earlier men which, after being lost for centuries, have come again within our human ken. Like a comet speeding from out the boundless deep toward and around our sun, plunging back for years into the vast abyss whence it came, then returning again decades later to be seen by the wondering eyes of a new generation of earth-born mortals, so do these items of knowledge seem to come to mankind in the first place from out the firmament of the unknown, to leave for a time human spheres of influence in a plunge back into the mysterious realm whence they came, then to reveal themselves again to the growing mind of a rejuvenated humanity. What is the logical significance of such rediscovered knowledge? Can it be that there is none?

For it might be argued that the title of this paper, as well as the simile just used, beg the question in that they assume that such examples as were mentioned above are cases of our knowing exactly

what earlier men knew. Perhaps the knowledge of Lord Carnarvon and Doctor Carter of the tomb and its contents was not the same as the knowledge the Egyptians had of these objects. Perhaps the formula for tempering copper which the obscure mechanic sold for a million dollars is not the same as the formula known to the Egyptians. Perhaps arrow-heads can be made from flint without iron tools by the use of some other principle than that of the conchoidal fracture, and it may be that the Indians of the stone age actually used some other principle. In short, what was known to earlier men may not be identical with what is known to-day. Instead of speaking of a rediscovery of knowledge, perhaps we should rather speak of a recreating of knowledge. Instead of supposing that the social object which the Egyptians knew is the same as that which we know, perhaps we should suppose that their attempts to satisfy the insistent demands of their nature created a tomb and filled it with rich treasures, whereas our curiosity to know about and our desire to profit by the doings of an extinct race revivified the tomb and its contents, after the vital impetus had leaked out of them due to their having lost close contact with the ongoing processes of life for hundreds of years. Thus what we know may be, after all, quite different from what earlier men knew, even in those cases where there is an apparent identity.

Doubtless there is a sense in which this is true. In any case it is not necessary here to argue the vexatious question of whether pure identity is conceivable, since some identity is all that it is necessary to assume in order to justify calling the examples under consideration rediscovered knowledge. Let the identity in question be an *identity in difference,* and not an identity of the one-one correspondence type. And if any identity whatsoever be denied, on the logical ground that the hypothesis that there is absolutely no connection between our knowledge and that of earlier men is just as legitimate as the supposition of some identity, then let identity in difference be regarded as only an assumption. For even though it does seem to be the most reasonable assumption to make, and the one most in accord with the law of parsimony, nevertheless the argument of this paper is rather concerned with the implications of the *possibility* of rediscovered knowledge than with those of its *actuality.* Indeed, the question might be put: How could rediscovered knowledge be possible? Or, more exactly, If there is no actual case of rediscovered knowledge, what are the essential conditions which would make one possible? But although acceding to the demands of those who would deny the existence of rediscovered knowledge might require that the question be put hypothetically, I prefer to state it categorically. What is

implied in holding that the content of our knowledge is in any sense identical with what earlier men knew? The answer to this question should bring to light the logical significance of rediscovered knowledge.

Logicians are generally agreed in recognizing three different factors in what may be called a typical knowledge situation. For example, in the knowledge of how to temper copper there are involved in the first place nobody knows how many psychical acts in or of the mind, or physiological processes in or of the brain, nerves, and sense organs of the particular being who knows. These may be called the psychological or biological aspects of the knowledge situation, and any one who is at all conversant with the ramifications of contemporary psychology knows how enormously complicated these factors may become even in the simplest concrete situation. But in the second place other facts of nature, outside of the organism of the particular being or group of beings who know, are always involved in a typical knowledge situation. In the example at hand, there would be at least one piece of copper and only an expert knows how many other little concrete objective entities of a chemical nature, which are obviously quite different from any of the psychical or physiological processes of the organism. Call these objective entities what you will—sensa, sense-data, sense-objects, space-time events, electrons, or what-not—still they exist in constantly shifting positions, situated, it may be, in some deeper mobile duration. These concrete external facts may not be one whit more objective than the physiological processes going on in the organism of the being to whom they are objects, nevertheless they are not to be forthwith identified with those processes, since they belong to a different stratum of nature or level of reality. Let us call the totality of these concrete, natural events or facts involved in a typical knowledge situation the objective, existential factor. But in the third place there is the formula for tempering copper, which can not be identified either with the biological or with the objective existential factor. It is a universal order-system, essentially supersensible and supertemporal. It is meaningless to refer to this universal formula as an event in the space-time matrix or duration or reality which is going on both in the organism and in the facts, or, more exactly, both in the cognitive activity of the organism which knows and in the passage of the concrete facts of nature. For it is not going on or passing or changing so far as can be ascertained. In fact, it is just because it differs from the other two factors by being changeless that it has to be differentiated from them. This universal order-system, which in the example before us is the formula for tempering copper,

constitutes what may be called the objective ideal or universal (as distinct from existing or particular) factor in the knowledge situation.

Now it would seem that the identity essential to there being a genuine case of rediscovered knowledge must reside in one or the other of these three factors. To be sure, it might be said to reside in the whole situation rather than in any one of its three factors, but it could not conceivably reside in the whole without manifesting itself in the parts. Hence it is sufficient to examine these three factors to see which one of them is best suited to function as the bearer of the identity indispensable to a genuine case of rediscovered knowledge.

All psychological theories of knowledge, of which behaviorism is the most popular in contemporary thought, are primarily concerned either with the particular psychical acts of cognition, or with the physiological processes centering in the cerebral cortex, or with the system of bodily behavior constituted by the articulated responses of one or more individuals to a common or social object. Such theories make knowledge consist, if not entirely at least fundamentally, in such concrete psychical or biological processes. It is, therefore, obvious that on the basis of all such theories the assertion of an identity between what we know and what the Egyptians knew is simply absurd. For the psychical acts of individuals and of groups, and the physiological functionings of human bodies living here in America to-day, can not conceivably be identical with the psychical acts and biological processes of a race of men extinct for centuries. Although a Samuel Butler might enshrine the idea in literature, not even a Freudian could convince an intelligent person that we bring up from some nether region of our frail human nature memory images due to the experiences of the Egyptians, when we reach a knowledge of something which they knew. Hence psychological logicians must either abandon their basic principle of interpretation or deny the very possibility of rediscovered knowledge.

Now this applies also to pragmatism. For although pragmatists do not make knowledge dependent on the psychical acts or the physiological processes of individuals, they do make it dependent upon the activities of what they call *creative intelligence,* by which they mean an interpenetrating social mind. But how can they prove that the creative intelligence of contemporary life is continuous with and creates the same knowledge as the creative intelligence of the Egyptians? The wide gaps between our civilization and that of Egypt seem too abysmal to support an identity between our knowledge and theirs, if we remain within the confines of pragmatist principles of explanation, chief among which is the dogma of perpetual change or

evolution. Taken in and by itself, the biological factor in knowledge is entirely too shifting to bear the identity essential to a case of rediscovered knowledge.

Suppose, then, that we seek this identity in the second factor of the knowledge situation, among sensa or events. Here certain external facts do appear to be the same as those perceived by the Egyptians. The actual pieces of tempered copper taken from the tombs are doubtless identical with those placed in the tombs and known to the Egyptians. But, of course, the sensa which are produced when our sense organs are brought into juxtaposition to one of these pieces of copper are not the same as the sensa produced when the Egyptians perceived them. For sensa are admittedly the most evanescent of all the entities of nature. Nor are the events the same. For the piece of copper has unmistakably aged, and is, therefore, a sense-object situated in a duration one end of which may have been a consentient set of events constituted by the act of perception of some Egyptian and the other end of which is a consentient set constituted by the act of perception of some modern man. How do we know that the events at this end of the series are really continuous with those known to the Egyptian? How do we know that there is a single series? How do we know that there is one continuous duration in which the events known to the Egyptians and those known to us and those in between are all synthesized to form a common sense object? Of course, we only know it by assuming it, and we assume it because it is the only way we can justify thinking that the piece of copper taken from the tomb is identical with one placed there by the Egyptians. But when we give such a synthetic function to a duration, do we not make that duration more like the supertemporal universal order-system than it is like a spatio-temporal event? Why should a duration be regarded as having the same nature as an event when it is capable of tieing together such diverse factors? When the unifying principle behind the concrete objective existential facts in knowledge is really tracked down to its lair, the pursuer is taken beyond those facts to a pervading logical and supertemporal universal order-system, even though he continues to call that ideal reality a duration. For this reason the assumed continuous duration does afford a correct explanation of the identity of a sense-object which is known to-day with one known to the Egyptians.

Yet the formula for tempering copper is not a mere sense-object. And it is highly improbable that perceptual knowledge of a piece of tempered copper would reveal the chemical process essential to temper a piece of the pure metal. This chemical formula must also enter into the universal order-system, and when it is added to the events

and the sense-objects situated in the events, the system as a whole can no longer be called a duration. For the formula is a non-durational factor. It does not exist in any on-going process. It is not psychical in its nature and it is not biological or physical. It is an ideal reality which transcends all particular existing pieces of copper in which it is embodied and it had to be discovered and put into them before they existed as tempered copper. And it also transcends all particular events and series of events in which these separate pieces of tempered copper are situated, and all particular psychical acts and physiological processes of every finite mind and body which may ever have known it or may ever come to know it in future. Because this ideal reality binds the constituents of the other two factors into a whole it is the heart of all knowledge. It pulsates alike in the Egyptians' knowledge of how to temper copper and in that of the mechanic and those to whom he sold his secret. And if on some distant planet there be an intelligence which knows how to temper copper, this ideal reality pulsates in that individual's knowledge, too. For this ideal order-system is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. It is the eternal content which constitutes the knowledge of how to temper copper. The chief significance of rediscovered knowledge is that it brings to light the necessity and the importance of the ideal factor in human knowledge. For only this factor possesses the permanence and the sameness essential to the bearer of the identity presupposed in a case of rediscovered knowledge.

Nothing is more hopeful to lovers of philosophy than the way in which contemporary thinkers, who started from widely different points of approach and who have, to a certain extent, ignored one another in the mad desire to be wholly and unmistakably original, are coming to recognize the necessity of an order-system, ideally real and transcending all space-time events and sense-objects, if human knowledge is to be validated at all. Differences in terminology do not ultimately count. They are inevitably dropped in the onward movement of philosophical culture. Call this universal ideal reality an order-system, a concrete universal, an essence, a non-psychical subsistent proposition, an objective, a neutral entity, a fact complex, a duration, or invent for it any other nomenclature with which to perplex the minds of those who seek the secrets of a philosopher (and let it be freely admitted that some of these terms express distinctly different ways of conceiving of this system), nevertheless in some form it must ultimately come to recognition in any thoroughgoing attempt to comprehend the underlying reality which human thinking reaches. And when it comes to recognition all theories which reduce the content of knowledge to psychoses, or neuroses, or social re-

sponses, or transient events must wrap the draperies of their couch about them and lie down to slumber and to sleep. And if perchance to dream, even one of their bitterest enemies may vouchsafe the hope that no weird phantasies disturb the quiet eternity of their repose.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Mind as Behavior and Studies in Empirical Idealism. EDGAR ARTHUR SINGER, JR. Columbus: R. G. Adams and Co. 1924. ix + 301 pp.

Professor Singer has conferred a favor upon readers of philosophical books by collecting into a volume these original and delightful essays. Although appearing at intervals in various philosophical journals over a period of time from as far back as 1898 to as near as 1917, they cohere almost as well as the chapters of a single book. To be sure, there are places where one wishes that the writer had carried his thought further or connected it up more clearly from one article to another, but perhaps if he had, something of the special quality of his writing would have been lost. For here are thoughts put down with the lucidity and spontaneity of an artist's first sketch, and there is pleasure in wondering just how they are—or are not—carried to completion in the author's mind.

The book is divided into two parts: "Mind as Behavior" and "Empirical Idealism." The first is described in the Preface as "a frank attempt to show that mind *is* an 'observable' object." When the three first articles reprinted here appeared in 1911 and 1912, the thesis "mind is behavior" was, as Professor Singer says, new, and he can claim to have been, if not the first, at least one of the first of its propounders. Now, of course, the point of view is—I was tempted to write—an old one, for so extensive has been the discussion of it that it seems as if it had grown old in these few years since its first formulation. It would perhaps be strange, therefore, if the re-reading of these pages, already historical, were to affect the controversy at its present crisis. Perhaps all statements of behaviorism are bound to be rather *simpliste* as philosophy, however useful as methodology for experimental psychology. And Professor Singer's statements are of this same general character; only, in view of the fact that they represent a first, original enunciation, one can not be offended, any more than one is, say, by a challenging statement from Hume that one knows to be not quite true. And, just as while reading Hume one is nevertheless often stimulated to re-think a problem

now very old, so some of those who read or re-read Professor Singer's provocative chapters, "Mind as an Observable Object," "Consciousness and Behavior," and "On Mind as an Observable Object," will probably be induced to orient themselves once more with reference to the proposed identification of mind with behavior. For myself, when I try to determine just what the behavior is that can be identified with mind, I find that so much interpretation has gone into the definition of it that I can not decide whether even it, the behavior, be not, after all, as much, if not more, of an inferable than an observable object. But, then, who has fixed the limits between observation and inference, as Professor Singer himself insists in his chapter, "Sensation and the Datum of Science"?

Although believing that mind is behavior, Mr. Singer is not, he takes care to tell us, a mechanist, because "all the categories of life and mind are teleological." Life is teleological because all its activities are self-preservative: "a being who so acts that the repetition of his act is well calculated to result from it, whose act is seen to be a means of ensuring its recurrence, is a self-preservative being" ("The Pulse of Life," page 71). Mind differs from mere life in being more resourceful in insuring self-preservation. Yet, although a teleologist, Mr. Singer is not a monadist—that is, he does not seek to extend the concept of mind to the inorganic world. For him mind and life have meaning only as pulses within a mechanical system. Now if, as Professor Singer holds, a criterion of life or mind is a definition of life or mind, I should question whether he has provided us with either. For is not an echo, or any wave motion for that matter, equally self-preservative, in Professor Singer's sense? Has it ever been possible to give any simple criterion of either life or mind? Once more, in the further elaboration of the doctrine in the chapters, so interesting and stimulating nevertheless, "The Pulse of Life," "On Sensibility," and "On Pain and Dreams," I find a too great simplicity. In addition to the chapters already mentioned, Part One contains a mathematical "Discussion of Sensation Intensity," and a final one, "On Man and Fellow Man," in which it is contended that, although it "takes two minds to make one mind," and so to establish any truth or meaning whatsoever, any one mind is always its own "other," and so, as such, is already the two minds sought.

This last chapter of Part One leads easily to the second part. And here a surprise awaits the reader. For who would expect that the champion of a realistic account of mind would maintain a highly sophisticated, if "empirical," idealistic epistemology? For all the time that Professor Singer urges upon us the necessity for seeking a strictly "objective" definition of mind, he assures us that sensa-

tion is no datum for science; that, in fact, "an absolutely simple and ultimate datum we neither must nor can have ("Sensation and the Datum of Science," page 184); in "Choice and Nature," he quotes with approval Kant's famous pronouncement "the order and uniformity of the phenomena we call nature, we ourselves introduce into them," and himself adds, "the real importance of observation is to serve as the stimulus to new interpretations" (page 222); in the chapter, "Kant's First Antimony: The Question of Fact," page 281, he tells us "the real fact is an ideal"; and finally, in the charming essay, "The Mathematician and His Luck," page 288, he approves of the view that "nature is no *Ding-an-sich*, but the name of a certain ideal." For Professor Singer, indeed, the realistic account of mind and this epistemological position are mutually dependent (see, for example, page 30). Now, this is a matter about which I wish Professor Singer had been more explicit. The wish is confirmed when one ponders the two lucid chapters, "On Mechanical Explanation" and "On Final Causes." In the first of these we find a definition of the "traditional" mechanical ideal as the hypothesis that the dimensions of all sciences can be reduced to those of mechanics, namely, mass, length, and time, and an attempt to show that the progress of science has indicated no barriers to its realization. In the latter, we have the suggestive view that teleological explanation depends upon a highly selective grouping of phenomena, and, as such, is at once objective and consistent with mechanism. And yet (page 239, note, and page 258) Professor Singer hints that perhaps a perfect mechanical explanation, possible as it may be, is not the final solution of the problem of explanation. Well, why not? Will Professor Singer some day tell us in a more systematic fashion than is possible in a series of articles, no matter how well selected and arranged?

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The Ethical Basis of the State. NORMAN WILDE. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1924. Pp. 236.

To write a book on the philosophy of the State without forcing on the reader a sure cure for the present ills of that institution is a notable achievement. Yet Professor Wilde has succeeded in doing that very thing. He does not attempt to draw up a finished plan for political reform, but rather to go behind the scene of political controversy in order to discover more clearly the nature and function of the State. The task which he sets himself is the investigation of the basis of political obligation in terms of the purpose which the

State serves in the moral life. As the title of the present volume points out, the State is regarded as a moral institution rather than a political body.

After a critical survey of the history of the State and political theories, remarkable for its succinctness and completeness, Professor Wilde proceeds to an analysis of the outstanding problems of civic philosophy. These all center in the place of the State in the moral life of its members. Neither as the master institution to which all other institutions owe allegiance nor as one institution among many is the State to be justified. To make the State absolutely sovereign, the repository of an abstract social will, is to make it frankly utopian, to remove it from all contacts with the actualities of human existence. The ideal State differs in kind from the existent State, and discussion of its function and purpose has nothing to do with political realities. On the other hand, to reduce the State to the level of the other elements of institutional life is to deprive it of that unifying function which constitutes its ultimate claim on existence. That is precisely the mistake made by all theories that would organize the State along functional lines: the industrial State satisfies a need of human nature only so far as man is an economic being; the Guild Socialist State satisfies many specific human needs, but it has no contribution to make to the indivisible moral life of the whole man.

Professor Wilde's own view of the ethical justification of the State is midway between these extremes of political monism and pluralism. With the monists he insists that the State serves a purpose broader and more central than the purposes which the other institutions serve: with the pluralists he agrees that this purpose is to be conceived in terms of concrete individual wills and interests, not in terms of a completely unified social interest. His position is both a qualified idealism and a modified individualism. The common purpose embodied in the State is the moral purpose of a group of individuals only partially interested in willing the social good; the interests of these individuals are only partially antagonistic and self-regarding. The State is neither unitary nor multiple. It is the structure demanded by the social nature of man, the natural expression of the otherness of particular wills and interests. The State is the organization of the purposes shared by unsocially sociable human beings. The usefulness of the State in helping man to lead a moral life is to be judged by reference to the life of the social individual, the concrete man. Professor Wilde, accordingly, endorses the proposal of the neighborhood group as the basis of the political unit. The group within which the individual lives and works can best represent the whole man—how, specifically, it would be interesting to be told in greater detail in another volume.

Professor Wilde's book is valuable chiefly for its success in relating a social and political ideal to the facts out of which it grows. He is neither blind to, nor blinded by, the conditions of social life to-day. His criticism of the State is not unmindful of its strength and weakness, but these are to be traced ultimately to the facts of human nature in its social aspect. Successful reform of the State, then, can not be instituted from above, from the side of political machinery; it must start from below, from the side of the constituent individuals. The ideal of civic reform, the stimulation of the individual's "active interest in the common life," is firmly rooted in the facts of social psychology and ethics. "To be truly interested in an ideal is to be interested in what can be made out of what is here and now" (p. 226). And Professor Wilde possesses this two-sided interest to a marked degree. There lies the significance of his viewpoint. His ability to see the good and bad in the present social order in the light of a definite social ideal enables him to provide for political theory a "sound idealism" on which the structure of the new State can be more safely erected.

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Metaphysik im erkenntnistheoretischen Grundriss: Philosophische Gespraeche. WALTER EHRLICH. Halle: Max Niemeyer. 1924. Pp. 135.

There is here presented to us a series of philosophical dialogues embodying a set of personal convictions with reference to certain metaphysical problems and issues taken at random from modern German philosophy. The subject-object relationship which is introduced as a point of departure for arriving at a consistent and unequivocal meaning of reality leads the author to a behavioristic discrimination of four types of objects. The subjective world, defined as that which constitutes the usual run of events, is followed by an intersubjective reality composed of social and business relations, on which in turn is superimposed the purely objective totality of things as pictured by science. Universal validity of merely quantitative relations is the outcome of scientific inquiry. In the realm of science only quantitative relations lead to a final determination of the concept of the real. But since even quantitative relations can not conceal their origin within the subjective sphere (Kant), the assumption of a world in itself, independent from scientific experience, follows as a logical consequence. But here also a veil of "x's" conceals the philosophic meaning of reality and nothing but an empty network of relations in conformity to law remains of divine nature. The inevitable sub-

ject-object hypothesis thus effects step by step a shifting of the point of gravity toward the objective region and correspondingly a throwing off of "given contents" into the slough of defective subjectivity. Consequently, the author infers, only an unequivocal determination of the technical triumvirate of subject, object, and "Being" can solve the problem of objective validity—a hopeless undertaking, as we have had the occasion to remark in a previous review of the same author's critical study of Kant's and Husserl's theoretical philosophy, since upon the basis of epistemological relationship he is forced back into the very contradictions and absurdities which he is trying to avoid. Of this not the slightest doubt is left after reading the second discourse which introduces the fundamental concept of his metaphysics, "Being *ueberhaupt.*" Since this is achieved by means of an emphatic advocacy of the fabulous content-theory of knowledge, it is quite obvious that the author must break down by the sheer weight of problems involved. "Everything is contained in consciousness and exists only as content of consciousness" (page 23). The particularity of such relation as "experiencing" (erleben)[1] is bridged over by a rather genial method of "forgetting" the implied, personal, subjective factor, wherein any student of Husserl's phenomenology must recognize a duplication (in reversed direction) of the latter's phenomenological *reduction* of reality in the sense of the physical, or better, the natural world of objects. "Everything which is, will be, and has been, is super-personal objective experience" (page 22), the integration of an indefinite plurality of single experiences. The "integral experience" is the "Being *ueberhaupt,*" which is essentially a cosmic consciousness. The *"x,"* the well-known residuum in the Kantian garb of the thing-in-itself, is submerged into the conscious content of experience only to appear again on the surface of epistemological theorizing, this time, however, in the fashionable make-up of a "total" and "integral" experience *per se*, which as a universal cosmic consciousness is the abode of the "Being *ueberhaupt.*" Not taking into consideration the fact that elimination of the personal factor—unquestionably implied in the very meaning of the term "experiencing"—leads us on the road of mysticism, it constitutes a simple case of contradiction, which sufficiently demonstrates the absurdity of his basic conception. Such confusion is obvious in any attempt to employ a relational term for denoting supposedly essential entities. Is it hence surprising, when in the course of this elegant theory of experience, after having hypostatized consciousness to a self-contained, all-embracing fundamental essence, he makes the

[1] The term "experience" (experiencing—experienced) is used here as equivalent to the *deus ex machina* of modern German philosophy—Erlebnis (Erleben—Erlebtes).

somewhat perplexing admission that "we can not ask what being conscious in itself is, since it is not absolute" (page 24)?

If the term "consciousness" denotes and implies relationship, as the illustrations used certainly indicate, then it must be obvious that "the relation consciousness-content can not, without inconsistency, be solved" (page 25). And is this not an unacknowledged admission of the self-refutation of the doctrine of immanence, the adopted child of the copy theory of knowledge? Such a fallacy is due primarily to the ambiguity of the word "consciousness," the proud bearer of at least half a dozen traceable meanings, and also to the ambiguity of other terms which the author uses interchangeably, hence indiscriminately; secondarily, however, to his uncritical adherence to the content theory of knowledge, which is based upon the utter unintelligibility of interpreting consciousness in an attributive and qualitative sense. Or is it actually possible to point out a universal cosmic entity of super-personal experiential nature, of which "single experiences of single beings are but parts" (page 22), without pointing out its manifestations within the realm of the given, which, according to the author's own assertion, is ultimate in experience? Unfortunately for us, we can not locate a trace of it and must admit that "integral super-personal experience" signifies, if anything at all, nothing more than what we are accustomed to call the known in general (in a sense not necessarily restricted to empirical cognitive processes), which as such is a datum of universally generic character, and which the totality of knowers has potentially in common. Consequently, the author's tortuous attempts at defining his concept, "integral super-personal experience of Being in itself," merely yield a combination of redundant and tautological words, a practice too often to be found among contemporary philosophers.

To bridge the abyss between subjective experience and its objective counterpart (3d discourse), the assumption of levels of conscious intent becomes unavoidable, which in turn demands the unwarranted admission of structural gradations or the like within the realm of the given. This, of course, as the conception itself suggests, introduces a wealth of problems for imaginative pursuit and emotional revelling. The super-personal experiential sphere, inclusive of the higher stages of conscious behavior, is reached through ideation, coincident with an "expansion of the I" and characterized as the starting point of human knowledge (p. 40). The ethical significance of this conception is obvious, as is its theoretic comfortableness, since it secures an unrestricted, hence objectionable, use of finitive terms borrowed from "physical objects," as magnitude, extensity, width, structure, *etc.*, to characterize integral experience. The very fact,

lastly, that determinations, qualities, and properties of earthly objects are presented to us "in" perception or "in" intuition, and that superlative terms seem to be indispensable to making us at home in any metaphysical dreamland, introduces a new idea in the fifth discourse, called "experiential synopsis." This is a guiding agency for operations of ideational integration and inherently more than mere intuition, *ergo* the *"intuitus mysticus."* This obviously anticipates the turning point, since for us human beings "the road higher up is hardly passable" (page 80).

With reference to the remaining dialogues we can only say that it is entirely beyond the scope of a review to attempt to disentangle the confusions in which the author finds himself when meddling with problems of logical import.

ERIC BERNHARD.

NEW YORK CITY.

A Course in Philosophy. GEORGE P. CONGER. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1924. Pp. vii + 603.

An Introduction to Philosophy. JAMES H. RYAN. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1924. Pp. xvi + 399.

Problems of Philosophy. G. WATTS CUNNINGHAM. New York: Henry Holt & Company. 1924. Pp. xvi + 453.

Introduction to Philosophy. G. T. W. PATRICK. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1924. Pp. viii + 463.

In this age of outlines the introduction to philosophy has become a hardy perennial and every teacher seems to feel that he must cultivate his own variety. Yet the authors of these four books display surprisingly slight differences in their general viewpoint and way of putting the subject. Each one presumes that philosophy is a definite subject-matter which can be presented in a straightforward and impersonal fashion. This subject-matter consists of a number of "problems" for which there are certain solutions. The purpose of an introduction to philosophy is to inform the student that these problems exist and then acquaint him with all the extant theories about them, and the chief merits of the writer of an introduction will be clearness and impartiality. He must be careful to remain a professor.

These books, then, are intended as contributions to pedagogy, not philosophy, and their respective merits must be looked for in the degree of skill with which they exposit their subject-matter.

Professor Conger's book, however, is, as the title implies, something more than an introduction to philosophy, being too long for an introductory course and containing appendices, in which he recounts briefly the nature and significance of two theories of his own. Dis-

cussion of his interesting speculations on the "Implicit Duality of Thinking" and what Professor Conger calls the "Hypothesis of Epitomization" are not within the province of this review. Moreover, the first has already been explained in this JOURNAL and the second in the *Monist*.

The textbook proper is divided into three parts. Part one aims to introduce philosophy by showing the distinctive marks of the philosophical problems to be met with in every subject of discourse, and with illustrations from current discussions in literature, science, and religion. The second part attempts, very unsuccessfully, to summarize the whole history of philosophy in less than one hundred pages. Part three is an analysis of the problems of epistemology, metaphysics, the normative sciences, and the philosophy of religion, from a dualistic point of view. The problems discussed are so numerous that the "analyses" are often no more than a series of verbal distinctions while the book is written in a style uniformly dry and abstract.

Mr. Ryan's book is written from a roughly similar metaphysical standpoint, but with a marked difference of method and temper. Professor Conger means to be persuasive, but Mr. Ryan is openly polemical. His method is to first state the most representative arguments against the position which he wishes to defend and then refute them in the exposition of his own. This method is an ancient one and Mr. Ryan is so consciously in line with a weighty tradition that he too often dispenses with argument, or even his exposition, and simply makes remarks. Some of these dogmatisms are irritating and many of them are unintelligible without some sort of explanation. Mr. Ryan's *ex cathedra* manner is hardly suitable in teaching a subject which his predecessors presumed to originate in doubt.

Whereas Professor Conger and Mr. Ryan write largely in view of the ultimate problems of religion, Professor Cunningham attempts to couch his book in terms of fundamental scientific concepts. His main effort is to show how the problems of philosophy arise out of the "reflective enterprise" of attempting to understand the world in which we live and then to discuss them on their own merits without attempting to outline or defend any more specific system of philosophy than is implied in a generally naturalistic attitude. His book is divided into six parts. The first discusses the transition from common sense to scientific knowledge, the second is an inquiry into the nature and certainty of the reflective enterprise and a discussion of casuality as "the assumption of intelligence," and the remainder of the book is devoted to the analysis of problems arising out of the fundamental concepts of science on its various levels, space, time, and matter, evolution, mind, and society, and the world of values.

References to the history of philosophy are incorporated, usually as notes, wherever the author considers them helpful to his discussion. The book is clearly written and admirably organized, but the colorless neutrality of the author prevents one from feeling any vivid sense of the *reality* of the problems he discusses. Like the other books it is at once too abstract and too comprehensive to have much meaning for a beginning student in philosophy.

Professor Patrick is not so acute as Professor Cunningham, but he is more amiable and tries to arouse our friendship for his subject. His book is permeated with the conviction that there is a growing convergence in philosophical opinion. In the concept of *emergence* recently emphasized by S. Alexander and Lloyd Morgan, Professor Patrick sees an instrument for the consistent integration of what he considers true and valuable in both Naturalism and Idealism. The book is not arranged upon any readily discernible plan. Professor Patrick appears to treat the various topics he discusses in an order which he has found to be of the greatest pedagogical convenience. Since there is nowhere in the book any particular concern for system, this is hardly a defect. Although Professor Patrick also insists on going through the whole repertoire of "problems" from beginning to end, his platform manner is a bit more human and engaging.

Yet withal it is impossible to go through these books without wondering how they will ever interest any one in so dull a subject as philosophy. For what subject would not be dull when presented in texts which read like brief encyclopedias? And especially this subject which is so much more than mere subject-matter. If philosophy is the love of wisdom then to teach philosophy is to communicate more than knowledge. Clarity and impartiality and thoroughness are not enough. The teacher of philosophy must be careful *not* to remain a professor, for only *philosophers* can introduce us to philosophy, just as artists alone can introduce us to art. When one contrasts these four books with the introductions written by James, Royce, and Russell, or with the popular works of Descartes, Hume, and Fichte, or with the more literary dialogues of Plato one feels that there is little utility in summaries no matter how precise and skillful. As handbooks for reference they may possess some value, but not as introductions to philosophy, for there is no contagion in them. Indeed no introduction to philosophy which purports to be *merely* an introduction can ever really be written, for philosophers, like poets, insist on speaking for themselves.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. 32e Année, No. 2. Vie intérieure et Vie spirituelle: *L. Brunschvicg.* Les lois de probabilité dans les ensembles abstraits: *P. Lévy.* Existence et Objectivité: *G. Marcel.* Kant et le problème des Valeurs: *M. Déat.* Georg Simmel, philosophe de la vie: *V. Jankelevitch.* La décadence de l'autorité de la loi: *G. Morin.*

DIE AKADEMIE. Eine Sammlung van Aufsätzen aus dem Arbeitskreis der Philosophischen Akademie auf dem Burgberg in Erlangen. Heft I. 1924. Emerson: *E. R. Curtius.* Erik Gustav Geijer: *P. E. Liljeqvist.* Kunst und Natur: *E. Preetorius.* Der Bamberger Reiter: *P. O. Rave.* Einheitlichkeit der Gedankenwelt Nietzsches: *Max Oehler.* Descartes und Augustin: *A. Faust.* Die Lebenspsychologie von Müller-Freienfels: *Paul Feldkeller.* Heft II. 1925. Das Rationale und das Irrationale: *Hans Driesch.* Die Einheit Europas: *W. Haas.* Psychologische Anmerkungen zu Kants Phaenomenalismus: *Karl Groos.* Das systematische Grundproblem in Kants Opus postumum: *F. Lüpsen.* Vom Wesen des Stils: *H. Noack.*

ANNALEN DER PHILOSOPHIE. Band IV, Heft 9/10. Begriffsbildung und Beweis in der Mathematik: IV, Über angenäherte Darstellung einer beliebigen Zahl und das unbestimmte Unendlich. V, Das Imaginäre in der Mathematik: *M. Pasch.* Erkenntnistheoretische Grundlegung der Metaphysik: *Carl Fries.* Die Relativitätstheorie und die Struktur der physikalischen Erkenntnis: *Aloys Müller.* Fiktionen im Recht: *W. Hofacker.* Über den Gegenstandscharakter der Zahlen: *Aloys Müller.*

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PSYCHOLOGICAL CLINIC. Vol. XVI, Nos. 3–4. Standardization of a Color Cube Test: *R. B. W. Hutt.* Design Blocks—A Descrip-

tion of a Simple Clinical Test: *F. N. Maxfield.* Theory of Constancy of Intelligence: *W. Stern.* Grouping by Abilities: *M. C. Brooke.* Notwithstanding a High I. Q.: *Z. I. Hirt.* Relationship between Suggestibility and Intelligence in Delinquents: *J. A. McGeoch.* The Etiology of Mongolism: *L. R. Marston.*

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NOTES AND NEWS

The *Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology* has changed its name to the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* beginning with the issue of Volume XX, No. 1. In this number, it announces that Professor Henry T. Moore, of the Psychological Department of Dartmouth College, has become associated with the Editorial Staff and will coöperate in the active work of editing the journal. Dr. Moore, who takes the place of Dr. Floyd H. Allport (whose resignation was regretfully announced in a former issue) will particularly devote his activities to the department of social psychology. It also announces that the staff of associate editors has been strengthened by the addition of Dr. James Drever, of the University of Edinburgh; Dr. Franklin H. Giddings, of Columbia University; Dr. Floyd H. Allport, Syracuse University; and Dr. Henry Herbert Goddard, of Ohio State University.

A section of each number will be opened to correspondence. To this section readers are invited to contribute letters on topics of general interest. All original articles, editorial communications, and books for review should be addressed to Professor H. T. Moore, Dartmouth College, Hanover, N. H.